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THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTEREST IN HIGHER LAW
IN THE SUPREME COURT:
JUSTICES MARSHALL AND THOMAS
D. A. Jeremy Telman *
I: INTRODUCTION: TWO AXES OF LEGAL REASONING
For decades now, Professor Richardson has pursued the provocative position
that there is a centuries-old tradition of an African-American interest in
international law. This tradition is a subset of a broader category, ―outside law,‖ to
which African-Americans appeal to highlight the injustices to which they are
subjected under municipal law. Professor Richardson‘s invocation of international
law upsets suppositions of international legal realism and rationalism. Consistent
with international law teachings at Yale School of Law, Professor Richardson
rejects the notion that only states can be the agents and subjects of international
law, nor does he think that one must have some sort of title or letters (such as J.D.)
after one‘s name in order to hold views on the nature of transnational law.
Over the years, Professor Richardson has defined the African-American
interest in international law in various ways, and he treats the African-American
interest in international law in the context of a broader Black International
Tradition. In the early 1990s, Professor Richardson identified various international
law doctrines that intersected with African-American interests in selfdetermination, human rights, and limitations on the right of states to use force in
self-defense.

* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. The author thanks Geoffrey Heeren and
Mary Szto for their helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) [hereinafter RICHARDSON, ORIGINS]; Henry J. Richardson III,
The Black International Tradition and African American Business in Africa, 34 N. CAR. CENT. L.
REV. 170 (2012) [hereinafter Richardson, Black International Tradition]; Henry J. Richardson III,
Two Treaties, and Global Influences of the American Civil Rights Movement, through the Black
International Tradition, 18 VA. J. SOC POL‘Y & L. 59 (2010) [hereinafter Richardson, Two
Treaties]; Henry J. Richardson III, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests under
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT‘L L. 42 (1993) [hereinafter Richardson, Gulf Crisis].
2. See Henry J. Richardson III, Mitchell Lecture, October 27, 2010, 17 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2011) (asserting that because international law has traditionally been viewed as
something that occurs between sovereign states, actions and communications between
subordinated national groups go ignored by scholars, officials, or observers of international law).
3. Id.
4. Richardson, Black International Tradition, supra note 1, at 171; Richardson, Two
Treaties, supra note 1, at 60.
5. Richardson, Gulf Crisis, supra note 1, at 68.
6. Id. at 73.
7. Id. at 70.
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In Professor Richardson‘s book, The Gulf Crisis and African-American
Interests under International Law, the African-American interest in international
law is complex, but its history runs alongside the mainstream tradition of
international law, intersecting with that tradition largely in the realms in which
international law derives from natural law. The international law that Professor
Richardson invokes is largely not positive law but that part of customary
international law that serves as a repository for mechanisms and rubrics necessary
for the preservation of what I will call, for want of a better term, human dignity.
The narrative of Professor Richardson‘s book ends in the early nineteenth
century. However, in subsequent articles, Professor Richardson has continued into
the twentieth century. In invoking the Black International Tradition, Professor
Richardson moves beyond law to international relations and beyond the AfricanAmerican experience to sketch out African-American attitudes towards and
responses to the plight of Blacks in the Caribbean, South America, and Africa. In
so doing, he is attentive to the links between international human rights and civil
rights and between the U.S. civil rights movements and both foreign and
international liberation movements, some grounded in opposition to racism and
some grounded in the right of self-determination.
Elsewhere, I have expressed my positivist prejudices and my skeptical
assessment of ―higher‖ law as a font of international law protections of rights or
attributes associated with human dignity. I have described Professor Richardson‘s
invocation of an African-American interest in international law as an ideal-typical
reconstruction of what protections international law might offer—or what rights it
might convey—upon enslaved Africans or African-Americans subject to Jim Crow
laws and their various institutionalized legacies.
Upon continued reflection, I see the need to add a third modality to the mix.
The axis of legal reasoning that runs from natural law to positivism intersects with
an axis that runs from idealism to practicality. When we consider the role of
appeals to positive law and to higher law in the jurisprudence of the U.S‘ two
African-American Supreme Court Justices, Thurgood Marshall and Clarence
Thomas, the evidence is equivocal. One could argue that both decide cases based
on deep ethical convictions grounded in personal morality. Both appeal, in very
different ways, to sources of positive law. Where they differ, I contend, is that
Justice Marshall‘s jurisprudence is always grounded in his rich and detailed
understanding of the impact of law on people who reside at the intersection of race
and poverty. Justice Thomas, in the recent opinions that I will discuss, has
supplemented his natural law instincts with a rigid formalism that leaves no room
for a richly contextual jurisprudence like that of Justice Marshall. In what follows,
I will sketch out my reasons for concluding that his jurisprudence is the more
hopeful avenue than is Justice Thomas‘s for the protection and realization of
African-Americans‘ legal interests.
8. Id. at 61–67.
9. D.A. Jeremy Telman, Henry J. Richardson, III, The Origins of African-American
Interests in International Law, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 395, 397–410 (2010) (book review).
10. Id. at 399.
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II: JUSTICE MARSHALL: HIGHER LAW AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE
In most of his constitutional opinions, Justice Marshall relied not on
evocations of higher law but on the text of the Constitution and on case precedent.
This is not the place to undertake a comprehensive review of Justice Marshall‘s
jurisprudence; a summation of representative opinions will have to suffice.
When interpreting the Constitution‘s ―majestic generalities,‖ Justice
Marshall was inclined to something akin to Jack Balkin‘s ―text and principle‖
approach. It would be folly to deny that a ―higher law‖ sensibility informed
Justice Marshall‘s opinions. Still, he enforced only those principles embraced in
the constitutional text.
In addition, he applied constitutional principles with a keen eye to empirical
evidence of discrimination and to socioeconomic realities. On race issues, Justice
Marshall recounted how a Porter pullman told Justice Marshall that ―he had never
been in any city in the United States where he had to put his hand up in front of his
face to find out he was a Negro.‖ Justice Marshall shared such stories with his
fellow Justices so that they would not lose sight of the fact that ―there is another
world out there‖ on the other side of the racial divide.
Justice Marshall approved of race-conscious classifications only where
designed to achieve remedial goals, necessary to important government purposes,
and substantially related to those purposes. Beginning with City of Richmond, the
Court‘s conservative majority has subjected remedial race-conscious
classifications to something akin to strict scrutiny, which Justice Marshall
11. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
12. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 428 (2007) (characterizing the text and principle approach as a form of
redemptive constitutionalism); see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 295–311 (2007) (elaborating on ―text and principle‖ approach to constitutional
interpretation).
13. Justice Marshall followed the constitutional text, where it was clear, even if doing so led
to an outcome that was at odds with his own ethical-political perspective. See ROGER GOLDMAN
& DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 209 (1992) (characterizing
Marshall‘s opinions in Curtis and Loretto as evidencing Marshall‘s tendency to follow the
constitutional text, where it is clear, ―even if the results seem inconsistent with his personal
views‖). In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), he found that the Seventh Amendment entitled
a white landlord facing a racial discrimination suit to a jury trial, even though a bench trial would
have better suited the plaintiff, with whom one can assume Justice Marshall was sympathetic. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), he gave a broad reading
of the Takings Clause and found that it entitled a property owner to compensation even for very
small physical invasions of property, in this case for the installation of a cable box.
14. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991 4 (1997).
15. Id.
16. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 535–36 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517–19 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (joint opinion of Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ).
17. See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that
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rejected based on history and logic: the fact that Whites constitute a minority group
in Richmond, Virginia does not make them automatically a suspect class that needs
the Court‘s protection in order to safeguard its rights.
Justice Marshall did not read the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection
Clause in the light of its framers‘ narrow intent to protect African-Americans
against racial classifications. Rather, he believed that the intent of the Equal
Protection Clause was to abolish all caste legislation. He accordingly applied
heightened scrutiny to cases that burden important interests (such as education or
access to the courts) of disadvantaged persons, whether the source of that
disadvantage sounded in race, gender, alienage, or economics, openly avowing a
sliding scale and abandoning the increasingly opaque rhetoric about levels of
scrutiny.
In Dandridge v. Williams, plaintiffs challenged Maryland‘s $250 per month
limit on the funds a family could receive under the federal Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Act. The $250 ceiling applied regardless of the size of the
family. The majority rejected plaintiffs‘ statutory and constitutional challenges,
but Justice Marshall dissented, pointing out that the $250 ceiling was
―fundamentally in conflict with the basic structure and purposes of the Social
Security Act.‖ Justice Marshall also characterized the majority‘s opinion as an
―emasculation of the Equal Protection Clause‖ in the area of social welfare
administration.
The dissent begins with a close reading of the Social Security Act, its
legislative history and relevant case law, and concludes that Maryland‘s regulation
is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. Justice Marshall then turns his
attention to the Equal Protection Clause and has no difficulty concluding that there
is no rational basis for treating children differently depending on the size of their
families. Although grounded in a sense of social justice, Justice Marshall‘s
jurisprudence is positivist throughout. The main thrust of his argument appeals to
legal authority and good old-fashioned common sense, in which his opinions
abound.
A moral foundation underlies Justice Marshall‘s approach to the Equal
Protection Clause. A broad view of our constitutional system‘s interest in
promoting justice and equality inform Justice Marshall‘s dissent in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
[T]he majority‘s holding can only be seen as a retreat from our historic
commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupportable
acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years
strict scrutiny should apply to all classifications based on race).
18. Id. at 554 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 472–74 (1970).
20. Id. at 474–75.
21. Id. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 510–17.
24. Id. at 517–18.
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of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens. The Court does this
despite the absence of any substantial justification for a scheme which
arbitrarily channels educational resources in accordance with the fortuity
of the amount of taxable wealth within each district.
But Justice Marshall quickly segues from his moral foundation to a detailed
analysis of the mechanisms through which Texas discriminated against poor
children in the public education system. In comparison to property-poor school
districts, property-rich school districts were able to allocate ten times the funds per
pupil to public schools. Justice Marshall agreed with the District Court‘s
assessment that Texas distributed state funds so as to ―subsidize the rich at the
expense of the poor.‖
The remainder of the opinion supports Justice Marshall‘s thesis: ―When the
Texas financing scheme is taken as a whole . . . it produces a discriminatory impact
on substantial numbers of the school age children of the State of Texas.‖ For
Justice Marshall, no stranger to Equal Protection litigation, ―inequality in
education facilities provided to students may be discriminatory state action‖
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. While one might think that Equal
Protection analysis is reserved for protected classes or fundamental rights, Justice
Marshall, good positivist that he is, shows that there is no basis, both in the
constitutional text or in case precedent, for a demand that the protected group be
precisely defined. He points to a recent precedent (Bullock v. Carter) in which the
Court applied Equal Protection analysis without being able to specify a suspect
class.
Justice Marshall‘s approach is similar in cases that do not arise under the
Equal Protection Clause. In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall again begins his
concurring opinion with what appears to be a moral claim, when he opines that the
American people, if they were fully informed about the death penalty, would reject
it on moral grounds. But even here, what seems like a moral claim is grounded in
intuitions, drawn from experience, about human nature. He is not arguing about
our moral intuitions in the abstract—he just assumes that reasonable people, were
they aware of how our death penalty operates, would not be willing to accept it.
But his main argument against the death penalty was empirical—it is not an

25. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70–71 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
26. Id. at 74–75.
27. Id. at 81.
28. Id. at 72.
29. Id. at 84.
30. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
31. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 92–94.
32. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362–64 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 228, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (reiterating Justice Marshall‘s view that the constitutionality
of the death penalty should turn on the views of an informed citizenry).

_31.1_TELMAN_ARTICLE 16 (DO NOT DELETE)

294

4/21/2017 3:24 PM

TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L.J.

[31.1

effective deterrent and is therefore an excessive punishment. Indeed, Justice
Marshall rejects moral arguments that seek to justify the death penalty as a
retributive expression of communal outrage. For Justice Marshall, such appeals to
communal morality are insufficient to overcome the Eighth Amendment‘s
protections of human dignity.
Justice Marshall‘s principled approach to constitutional interpretation takes,
as its point of departure, an abiding sense of fairness and justice. In the end,
however, Justice Marshall‘s opinions are grounded, not in higher law, but in the
realities of litigants who live at one of the many intersections of discrimination and
poverty.
III: JUSTICE THOMAS: HIGHER LAW AND PROCEDURAL FORMALISM
Justice Thomas has established himself as one of the most unusual thinkers
the Supreme Court has ever seen. He is the most consistently originalist Justice the
Court has seen, with the possible exception of Justice Black. Like Justice Black,
Justice Thomas is not intimidated by the existence of legal precedent, no matter
how well-established or long-standing, if he thinks that precedent is inconsistent
with the Constitution‘s original meaning. Like Justice Black, Justice Thomas
writes a lot of opinions in which no other Justices join. His positions are
principled, consistent, intellectually rigorous, and historically informed. Through
his legal opinions, Justice Thomas, together with Justice Scalia, has inspired a
jurisprudential movement with which other Justices, judges, and legal thinkers
must contend. There is much to admire in Justice Thomas‘s approach to
constitutional adjudication. However, as I contend below, it is not a jurisprudence
that furthers the African-American interest in higher law, as articulated in
Professor Richardson‘s work.
Two prominent examples will serve to illustrate Justice Thomas‘s willingness
to appeal to a higher law context for interpreting the U.S. Constitution. First, there
is his concurring opinion in McDonald, in which he invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for substantive individual
rights not expressly granted in the Constitution‘s text. Justice Thomas joined his
four conservative colleagues in Heller in finding that the Constitution‘s Second

34. See id. at 233–36 (reviewing the Ehrlich study, which purported to show that the death
penalty has a deterrent effect, and finding it unpersuasive).
35. Id. at 237–40.
36. See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . ., 42 OHIO N. U. L.
REV. 529, 552–66 (2016) (comparing Justice Thomas‘s originalism with that of Justice Scalia).
37. See id. at 535 (calling Justice Black an outlier on the Court whose originalism did not
sway others).
38. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 63, 63 (1988) [hereinafter Thomas,
Higher Law] (―The best defense of limited government, of the separation of powers, and of the
judicial restraint that flows from the commitment to limited government, is the higher law
political philosophy of the Founding Fathers.‖).
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Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms. In McDonald, Justice
Thomas‘s lone concurring opinion found the individual right to bear arms to be a
―privilege‖ of citizens guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Thomas understands the privileges of citizens to derive from higher law, that is,
from natural law. McDonald was the first time that he identified a particular right
protected as a ―privilege‖ guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Justice Thomas‘s defense of the ―privilege‖ of the individual right to bear
arms is grounded both in a natural rights tradition and in a version of the realities
of African-American lives in post-bellum America. It is a reading of the
significance of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause that
has not garnered much support outside of the academy. Even within the academy,
Justice Thomas‘s suggestion that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended that the Constitution‘s first eight Amendments would be made applicable
to the States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause seems to be the minority
view. Justice Thomas‘s attempt to establish that the Constitution embraces sub
silentio particular rights derived from natural law principles seems unlikely to
succeed.
The second example of Justice Thomas‘s appeal to higher law is his recent
invocation of the principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence as
informing his originalist reading of the Constitution:
When the Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that
―all men are created equal‖ and ―endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights,‖ they referred to a vision of mankind in which all
humans are created in the image of God and therefore of inherent worth.

39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
40. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 813–49.
41. See id. at 817 (citing to various seventeenth and eighteenth century American
documents that describe the privileges of citizens in terms of natural law).
42. See id. at 829–50 (reviewing nineteenth-century sources and concluding that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was originally intended to protect citizens of the several states
against encroachments of rights protected under the first eight Amendments to the Constitution).
43. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. Chicago,
26 J. L. & POL. 273, 292 (2011) (arguing that Justices on both sides of the political spectrum have
their own reasons for keeping ―Privileges or Immunities moribund‖); see also Jeffrey D. Jackson,
Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City Of Chicago‟s Rejection of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 561, 576
(2011) (―[T]he decision in McDonald seems to clearly indicate that the Clause will indeed remain
dormant for the foreseeable future[.]‖).
44. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521 (4th ed. 2013) (concluding that
while some members of the Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to extend the application of the Bill of Rights to the
States, others did not think so and others never considered the question); see also Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 132,
137 (1949) (―Congress would not have attempted such a thing, the country would not have stood
for it, the legislatures would not have ratified [incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause].‖).

_31.1_TELMAN_ARTICLE 16 (DO NOT DELETE)

296

TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L.J.

4/21/2017 3:24 PM

[31.1

That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was built.
Even before Justice Thomas was appointed to the federal bench, he articulated his
version of originalism in which the Constitution is understood as ―the fulfillment
of the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.‖ On rare occasions, Justices
have appealed to the Declaration as an interpretive key to unlock the mysteries on
constitutional protections. Justice Thomas did not fully deploy his Declarationbased reading of the Constitution until Obergefell. Critics have suggested that,
even granting that ―the foundations of rights in the Constitution are predicated on
the innate human dignity asserted in the Declaration,‖ a right of all people to
marry as they choose might well be protected under the Declaration‘s
understanding of inalienable rights.
I break no new ground here in contending that Justice Thomas appeals to
higher law, nor do I think it should come as a surprise to anyone to hear that moral
Weltanschauungen inform the constitutional jurisprudence of both AfricanAmerican Supreme Court Justices. The more significant methodological
divergence between the two Justices transpires along the idealism/pragmatism axis.
Justice Thomas‘s recent opinions have been characterized by a procedural
formalism that fetishizes finality and rule of law principles while ignoring the
substantive fairness issues that inform Justice Marshall‘s more practical approach.
This formalism is a form of idealism, as it applies regardless of context. Formalist
approaches tolerate unjust results in individual cases if necessary to promote the
45. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Thomas, Higher Law, supra note 38, at 64 (characterizing the Constitution as ―a logical extension
of the principles of the Declaration of Independence‖); Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain
Reading” of the Constitution – The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation,
30 How. L. J. 983, 983–84 (1987) [hereinafter Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading”] (contending
that the Civil War Amendments must be understood in light of the principles of equality and
liberty embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution).
46. Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading”, supra note 45, at 985.
47. See Alexander Tsesis, The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional
Interpretation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 369, 384 (2016) (calling Supreme Court references to the
Declaration uncommon and irregular); see also Frank I. Michelman, The Ghost of the
Declaration Present: The Legal Force of the Declaration of Independence Regarding Acts of
Congress, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 585 (2016) (contending that the Declaration is not a source of law
but is and should remain a symbol of the national commitment to social justice); Darrell A. H.
Miller, Continuity and the Declaration of Independence, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 601, 602–04 (2016)
(arguing that the Declaration is not law, was not intended to be law, and is not treated by courts as
law); Lee S. Strang, Originalism‟s Subject Matter: Why the Declaration of Independence Is Not
Part of the Constitution, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 637, 638 (2016) (arguing that the Declaration is not
subject to constitutional interpretation).
48. See Scott Gerber, Clarence Thomas, Fisher v. University of Texas, and the Future of
Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1169, 1191–92 (2016) (noting that
Obergefell marked the first time that Justice Thomas had invoked the Declaration of
Independence in a case that did not involve race).
49. Tsesis, supra note 47, at 383–84.; see also Frank Michelman, The Ghost of the
Declaration Present: The Legal Force of the Declaration of Independence Regarding Acts of
Congress, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 596 (2016) (hypothesizing that Justice Thomas may regard the
Declaration as standing on equal footing with the Constitution as a source of positive law).
50. Tsesis, supra note 47, at 384.
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parsimonious allocation of legal resources and to strengthen the rule of law.
In Foster v. Chatman, Petitioner raised a Batson challenge to his 1987
conviction for capital murder. As Justice Kagan observed during oral argument,
the case presented ―as clear a Batson violation as a court is ever going to see.‖
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, finding ―clearly erroneous‖ the
state court‘s ruling that the Petitioner had failed to show purposeful discrimination
when state prosecutors used peremptory challenges to remove all AfricanAmericans from the jury pool. Justice Thomas wrote a lone dissent.
Tellingly, Justice Thomas began his dissent with the argument that
Petitioner‘s claim was procedurally barred. That is, even if Petitioner‘s trial was
tainted by racial prejudice in the selection of the jury pool, his execution should
proceed. Justice Thomas also faulted his seven colleagues for failing to give the
requisite ―great deference‖ to the trial court‘s finding that the prosecution had raceneutral reasons for excluding the African-American veniremen. That argument is
also doubly procedural, because the ―great deference‖ standard impedes careful
consideration of the merits of a claim and because Justice Thomas discounts, on
procedural grounds, the probative value of Petitioner‘s new evidence (the
prosecutor‘s files), which highlighted the prosecution‘s determination to exclude
all African-Americans from the jury. Justice Thomas focuses on procedural rules
and on the thirty years that have passed since the trial, while refusing to consider
that Georgia courts might have been unreliable gauges of the merits of Batson
challenges in the first few years after the Supreme Court decided Batson.
Green v. Brennan, decided the same day as Foster v. Chatman, produced a
similar 7-1 decision, with Justice Thomas writing another lone dissent. In Green,

51. Foster v. Chatman, 136 U.S. 1737, 1743 (2016).
52. Dahlia Lithwick, Peremptory Prejudice, SLATE (May 23, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/john_roberts_s_court_sees_racism_i
n_foster_v_chatman.html.
53. See Foster, 136 U.S. at 1747–55 (―An ‗N‘ was also noted next to the name of each
black prospective juror on the list of the 42 qualified prospective jurors; each of those names also
appeared on the ‗definite NO‘s‘ list.‖).
54. See id. at 1761 (―[T]he Court rules in Foster‘s favor . . . without adequately grappling
with the possibility that we lack jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court‘s ruling on the merits, based, in
part, on new evidence that Foster procured decades after his conviction, distorts the deferential
Batson inquiry.‖).
55. See id. at 1761–65 (―Georgia law prohibits Foster from raising the same claim anew in
his state habeas petition . . . Without such procedural bars, state prisoners could raise old claims
again and again until they are declared victorious, and finality would mean nothing.‖).
56. See id. at 1765 (―Because the adjudication of his Batson claim is, at bottom, a credibility
determination, we owe ‗great deference‘ to the state court‘s initial finding that the prosecution‘s
race-neutral reasons for striking veniremen . . . were credible.‖).
57. See id. at 1765–66 (―By allowing Foster to relitigate his Batson claim by bringing this
newly discovered evidence to the fore, the Court upends Batson ‗s deferential framework.
Foster‘s new evidence does not justify this Court‘s reassessment of who was telling the truth
nearly three decades removed from voir dire.‖).
58. Green v. Brennan, 136 U.S. 1769 (2016).
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Justice Thomas, the former head of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, was the sole Justice who would have rejected Petitioner‘s
constructive termination claim as time-barred. The case involved a Black man
who had worked for the Postal Service for 35 years. After he was passed over for a
promotion, he complained that he was denied the promotion on racial grounds.
Shortly thereafter, his supervisors accused him of delaying the mail in violation of
federal law. They offered him the choice between an unattractive transfer
involving a pay cut and resignation. After some time, Petitioner resigned and then
filed a discrimination suit based on his constructive termination.
While the Majority found that constructive discharge claims run from the time
the employee gives notice, Justice Thomas would not permit Petitioner to trigger
the alleged discriminatory matter that gives rise to his own claim. His dissent did
not acknowledge Justice Alito‘s concurrence, which argued that intolerable
working conditions led to Petitioner‘s decision to resign, and thus the timing of the
claim still turned on the employer‘s conduct. By ignoring Justice Alito‘s middle
ground, Justice Thomas opted for a purely procedural rule that would enable
employers to force employees to quit on discriminatory grounds and yet escape
any legal accountability for discriminatory conduct. In Green, as in Chatman,
Justice Thomas‘s approach highlights procedural bars to substantive adjudication
and shows a remarkable reluctance to explore in detail the circumstances in which
employment discrimination claims arise.
The same valuation of idealism over pragmatism colors Justice Thomas‘s
McDonald concurrence. The opinion offers a highly selective review of the
experience of African-Americans with guns. The problem that African-Americans
faced in the post-bellum period was not, as the Colfax Massacre illustrates, that
nobody recognized African-Americans‘ right to bear arms or that they lacked
access to guns. The problem was that they were outgunned and courts offered no
protection or vindication for African-Americans who were hunted down and
slaughtered by White militiamen.
59. See id. at 1790 (―Because the only employer action alleged to be discriminatory here
took place more than 45 days before petitioner Marvin Green contacted EEOC, his claims are
untimely. I therefore respectfully dissent.‖).
60. See id. at 1774–75 (―We address here when the limitations period begins to run for an
employee who was not fired, but resigns in the face of intolerable discrimination—a
‗constructive‘ discharge.‖).
61. See id. at 1774 (―[in constructive discharge cases] the ‗matter alleged to be
discriminatory‘ includes the employee‘s resignation, and that the 45-day clock for a constructive
discharge begins running only after the employee resigns.‖).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1791 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (―I would hold that only an employer‘s actions
may constitute a ‗matter alleged to be discriminatory.‘‖).
64. See id. at 1783 (Alito, J., concurring) (proposing a rule that an employee‘s resignation
should be considered a discriminatory act of the employer when an employer subjects an
employee to intolerable working conditions with the discriminatory intent to force the employee
to resign).
65. See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2009) (recounting the Colfax
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In a racially divided society, it is not possible for the subordinate group to
enjoy their rights and privileges on the same terms as the dominant group. Even if
Justice Thomas rooted his opinion in the lives and experiences of those most likely
to be subject to gun violence in the nineteenth century, it was wholly blind to the
role guns play in the lives of urban African-Americans and the economically
disadvantaged today. In the summer of 2016, in one week, police officers shot two
African-American men, allegedly because they were armed, even though they
made no attempt to reach for or use their weapons which, at least in one case, they
were legally permitted to carry. The ―privilege‖ of bearing arms is not worth
much if racial injustice translates it into a privilege to be targeted as a threat. Under
such conditions, something like Justice Marshall‘s pragmatism (and traditional
judicial humility) should have kicked in, upholding a city‘s decision to regulate
private gun ownership in the way best suited to that locality‘s particular needs.
These cases highlight the contrast between Justice Thomas‘ use of higher law
with that of Justice Marshall‘s. Justice Thomas decides these cases based on
abstract principles and refuses to consider the real-world consequences of
procedural bars or abstract principles. As a result, higher law can stand as a barrier
to the vindication of the African-American interest in higher law.
IV: THE FUTURE OF THE HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTEREST IN
HIGHER LAW
Professor Richardson‘s research explores the African-American tradition of
appealing to higher law. In addition, his scholarship, like Justice Marshall‘s
jurisprudence, is also grounded in the realities of African-American life. The
interests that he identifies in international law are rooted in experience, and that
grounds his work not only in abstract principles but also in the realities of the
struggle for social justice. Still, it is hard not to read a rueful irony back into the
sources that Professor Richardson mines to establish the history of AfricanAmerican interests in international law. Abstract principles, such as inalienable
rights and human dignity, must have seemed to enslaved Africans and AfricanAmericans as akin to Sasquatch – often invoked but rarely actually experienced.
Professor Richardson‘s work is grounded in the tradition of Thurgood
Marshall and not in the tradition of Clarence Thomas. He does not leave us with
abstractions. Rather, he enriches our understanding of the African-American
Massacre, in which hundreds of armed white militiamen killed scores of armed AfricanAmericans on April 13, 1873, most of whom had surrendered or were attempting to flee the
violence).
66. See Richard Faussett, Baton Rouge is Passionate, and Peaceful, after Shooting of Alton
Sterling, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/alton-sterlingpolice-shooting-baton-rouge.html (recounting how police shot Mr. Sterling after a struggle and
upon discovering that he was carrying a gun); Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Was „Reacting to
the Presence of a Gun,‟ Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016
/07/10/us/minnesota-officer-was-reacting-to-the-presence-of-a-gun-lawyer-says.html (recounting
the shooting of Philando Castile whom police pulled over for a broken tail light in Falcon
Heights, Minnesota).
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experience and its interaction with law through rich excavation of the historical
remains of that often elusive past. After reading his book, I encouraged Professor
Richardson to continue his narrative forward into the twentieth century. I think that
narrative would show that appeals to higher law take us only so far.
The arc of moral universe bends towards justice. It only bends towards
justice because societies do not suddenly realize the error of their ways and mend
themselves. Rather, each stretch along that arc contains major and minor victories,
as well as major and minor setbacks. Appeals to higher law can bend the arc
towards or away from justice, but the victories are more likely to occur when
higher law informs positive law grounded in social realities.

67. Martin Luther King, Jr., Sermon at Temple Israel of Hollywood (Feb. 26, 1965).

